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COMMENT.
POWER OF ATTACHMENT FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT.
A recent nisi prius case in Illinois has revived a discussion of the
power of courts to levy attachment for constructive contempt.
The origin of this power is uncertain. It was exercised freely
in the Star-Chamber upon the theory that the judge was the king's
representative and any affront to him was an affront to the king's
dignity. This Star-Chamber doctrine was boldly questioned in the
reign of Charles I when he attempted to punish members of parlia-
ment for utterances made in debate therein. On this occasion the
king weakened before judgment was given and had the cases trans-
ferred to the King's Bench, where judgment was given for him.
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The judges were careful, however, to base their decision upon the
double ground of affront to the king's dignity, and conspiracy to
slander the State and raise sedition and discord between the king,
his peers and the people. It was not thought safe to trust the judg-
ment on the sole ground of contempt in speaking the words.
Before the abolition of the Star-Chamber, the courts of common
law had settled down to the true principle, which sustains contempt
as an offense; i. e., the disturbance of the courts, or the judges
judicially sitting, or the hindering of the administration of justice,
but still declared the offense to be against the crown and its dignity.
Harrison's Case, Cro. Car. 503.
In this country the courts have assumed the prerogative of the
English courts; both the power to punish for contempts, which under
the English law were held to be acts which "disturb the courts or the
judges judicially sitting," or "the hindering'of the administration of
justice;" and also for those acts which were affronts to the
king's dignity, both, however, being assumed as incidental to the
court's power to punish any act which brings the court into contempt,
or hinders or intimidates it.
The feeling of dissatisfaction which not infrequently follows any
signal recognition of the latter phase of this power, has in several
cases resulted in its abolition by statute or constitution, and has
engendered a public sentiment which may at no distant day result in
its voluntary relinquishment by the courts.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in I8O2 committed one Pass-
more for a libel published agaiilst the defendant in a case then
pending, in which case Passmore was plaintiff. Respublica v. Pass-
more, 3 Yeates 44. The judges were impeached, and although
acquitted by a close vote, their action resulted seven years later in
the abolition of the power of courts in that State to attach and punish
summarily for constructive contempt. As a substitute, any person
feeling himself aggrieved was given the right to proceed against the
offender either by indictment or by an action for damages.
The Federal courts lost the power through the action of Judge
James H. Peck of Missouri, who, in 1826 inflicted most severe pun-
ishment upon a lawyer for the slightest act of constructive contempt.
Judge Peck was also impeached and acquitted, but Congress in 1831
passed an act providing that "the power of the several courts of the
United States to issue attachments and inflict summary punishments
for contempts of court shall not be construed to extend to cases
except the misbehavior of any person or persons in the presence of
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the said courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration
of justice, the misbehavior of any of the officers of said courts in their
official transactions, and the disobedience or resistence of any officer
of said courts, party, jury, witness, or any other person or persons
to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command of the
said courts." This law remains practically unchanged to-day. Sec.
725 R. S. For seventy years the Federal courts have been transact-
ing business with a degree of facility fully equal to that displayed
by any State court.
Constructive contempt has been abolished in New York by the
Code. Civil Code, Sec. 8. It was abolished in Iowa by the Code
as construed in State v. Dunham, 6 Iowa 245, and repudiated in
Illinois in Storey v. People, 79 Ill. 45.
The right to attach for constructive contempt is not claimed
to-day by an analogy. No judge attempts to base his judgment upon
any ground other than that of obstruction or hindrance of the admin-
istration of justice, drawing no distinction between direct contempt
committed in the presence of the court or resistance to its commands
and constructive contempt committed outside of the courts and tend-
ing only indirectly to influence them. The rights of courts to main-
tain their dignity by punishing actual contempts is unquestionable,
but may we not hope that with the growing tendency to disregard
inapplicable English precedents, our courts will recognize a distinc-
tion between direct and constructive contempt and will voluntarily
abrogate any supposed power they may have to punish an affront to
royalty, in their capacity as representatives of the sovereign of
England.
